UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
5th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 19 October 1993
at 3 p.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

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Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.5
19 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

93-81696 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

1. Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium), speaking on behalf of the European Community and its member States, said that, despite the end of the cold war, a twofold threat loomed over international détente: a rising tide of conflicts and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the accumulation of conventional weapons.

2. The conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia were a tragic example of the violent excesses of nationalism, which had reared its head in the wake of the cold war. The Community and its member States were participating actively in the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the region through the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, through direct contacts with the parties involved, through the presence of the European Community Monitor Mission, and within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The States members of the Community had provided over half the personnel for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and, through the Western European Union (WEU), were participating in measures to enforce the United Nations embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube. They were also providing substantial humanitarian assistance. The Community and its member States were making every effort to achieve a just and viable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was based on the principles of the London Peace Accords of 1992 and was acceptable to the three peoples which together made up that country.

3. The European Community and its member States welcomed the progress made by the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its potential for producing ballistic missiles. They urged that that work be continued until Iraq fully complied with all United Nations resolutions.

4. The European Community and its member States reaffirmed their appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7). During the resumed session of the First Committee in spring 1993, at which meetings were devoted to a reassessment of the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, the Community and its member States had submitted specific recommendations with a view to the reorganization and rationalization of the work of the various multilateral organs dealing with disarmament, which had been largely taken into account in General Assembly resolution 47/54 G of 8 April 1993. The inclusion of an agenda item on that question in the agenda of the current session offered hope that the Committee had taken the first step towards rationalizing its work.

5. The signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction had been a historic event. The Convention provided for the complete elimination of chemical weapons within 10 years and for an innovative control regime. For the Convention - which had been signed by 154 countries, four of which had ratified

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

it - to become an authoritative and effective instrument, full participation was essential. That would require the adoption by individual countries of legislation and procedures for the practical implementation of the Convention, and the establishment of the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by the time the Convention entered into force, which was expected to be in early 1995. The European Community and its member States expressed their satisfaction with the competent and businesslike manner in which the temporary secretariat of the Organization had begun its work in The Hague. It was essential that all the States which had signed the Convention should participate actively in the plenary sessions of the Preparatory Commission and in the working group of experts.

6. The European Community and its member States attached great significance to the full implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) which had entered into force in November 1992 and which, together with the Concluding Act of the 1992 Extraordinary Conference of States signatories to CFE (CFE-1A) and the Vienna Document of 1992, provided the basis for a significant strengthening of military and political stability and cooperation in Europe. The Community and its member States called upon all Parties to the treaty to observe faithfully all of its provisions, in particular the obligation to reduce the size of their armed forces, within the time-limit agreed at the CFE-1A Conference.

7. The Community and its member States emphasized the importance they attached to progress in the work of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. In that connection, they had submitted specific recommendations concerning a code of behaviour relating to the inter-State and intra-State aspects of security, as well as recommendations regarding transfers of conventional weapons. They believed that agreement among all States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with regard to questions of transparency in armaments, limitations on weapons and arms control would promote further progress in disarmament, and they appealed to all States participating in CSCE to ensure appropriate representation in the Forum, since the success of the Forum's work depended to a great extent on their full participation. Furthermore, the States members of the Community attached enormous importance to the entry into force as soon as possible of the Treaty on Open Skies of 1992, which they believed to be a unique confidence-building measure encompassing the entire territory of the signatory States.

8. Nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament remained among the most important disarmament priorities of the Community and its member States. They warmly welcomed the treaties between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991 (START-I) and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1993 (START-II). Since the entry into force of the START-II Treaty was organically linked to the implementation of the START-I Treaty, it was essential for the relevant parties to ratify the START-I Treaty and thereby fulfil their obligations under the Lisbon Protocol of 1992.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was a serious threat to global and regional security and stability. The Community and its member States believed

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

that the prompt entry into force of the nuclear arms control agreements which had been concluded and implementation of decisions on a unilateral basis in the area of nuclear arms control were of the greatest importance, and they supported the efforts of individual States to assist the States of the former USSR concerned in dismantling, within the specified time-limit and in the best possible security conditions, the arms designated for dismantling under the Agreement. In that spirit, they were contributing to the creation in the Russian Federation of an international scientific and technical centre, which they hoped would soon be able to assist in redirecting researchers in the former USSR employed in the military sector into civilian tasks.

10. The European Community and its member States noted with satisfaction the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. They also welcomed the decisions taken by France, the United States of America and the Russian Federation to suspend nuclear tests, as well as the confirmation by the United Kingdom that it would not conduct any tests as long as the moratorium announced by the United States remained in effect. The members of the European Community could not remain indifferent to the recent nuclear test conducted by China, which had been the first in more than a year.

11. As the Security Council had clearly announced at its high-level meeting in January 1992, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, like the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, constituted a threat to international peace and security. The European Community and its member States reaffirmed their steadfast support for nuclear non-proliferation in general and, in particular, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which they considered to be the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. They urged the States parties to that Treaty to pursue with them the goal of the unconditional extension of the Treaty in 1995 for an unlimited period. Furthermore, they noted with interest the proposals aimed at combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons put forward by the President of the United States at the opening of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

12. Believing that nuclear non-proliferation would be best served by universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and complete fulfilment of the obligations undertaken under that Treaty, the European Community and its member States welcomed the recent accession to the Treaty of a number of States, as well as the strengthening of the safeguards regime. They urged all countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay and to conclude general safeguards agreements with IAEA. That applied, in particular, to those former republics of the USSR which had so far not honoured their commitments under the Lisbon Protocol.

13. The European Community and its member States welcomed the efforts of IAEA to strengthen the safeguards regime and, in particular, the reaffirmation by the IAEA Board of Governors of the right of IAEA to conduct special inspections. They recalled their proposal regarding the establishment, of a register on a voluntary basis, including information on the production and transfer of nuclear materials and equipment. Their firm belief in the need to ensure strict compliance with the obligations undertaken by States had been confirmed by the existence in Iraq of a secret nuclear programme and by the obstacles created by

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

Iraq to the implementation of the rules established by IAEA and of United Nations resolutions.

14. The European Community and its member States took note of the unilateral decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend the process of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That positive step should be followed by an unconditional reaffirmation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its obligations under the Treaty. They urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with IAEA with regard to the full implementation of the safeguards agreement and called upon that country to reaffirm its commitment to respect the bilateral agreement on inspections which had been concluded with the Republic of Korea.

15. The drawing up at Harare of a draft treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa demonstrated the importance of nuclear disarmament and the interrelationship between regional and global disarmament. With respect to export controls, the European Community and its member States noted with satisfaction the decision of the group of nuclear material suppliers that an agreement on safeguards should be a precondition for the delivery of nuclear materials, and it called upon other States providing nuclear materials to do likewise. All States Members of the Community were parties to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which they believed was a useful instrument for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They were in favour of the further strengthening of that regime and appealed to all countries to adopt its guidelines. Furthermore, they noted with satisfaction that the Australian Group had introduced a comprehensive and agreed mechanism for the control of the export of dual-use substances and equipment relating to chemical and biological weapons. They advocated revising the rules of the Australian Group so that the obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would be taken more fully into account.

16. The Community and its member States expressed their support for the work carried out in 1993 by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly with regard to verification measures. Furthermore, they had noted with interest the Study on the Application of Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space (A/48/305) which had been prepared by a group of governmental experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990.

17. The Community and its member States were convinced that transparency in armaments could contribute very substantially to the creation of a climate of trust. A first step towards enhanced transparency and restraint in conventional arms transfers should be the full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 and 47/52 L of 15 December 1992. They were gratified to note that the Register of Conventional Arms had been in operation since the beginning of the year and that 80 countries had submitted the requested data to the Secretary-General. In addition, they appealed to all States which had not yet contributed information to the Register, including States which were not involved in arms exports or imports, to do so as soon as possible. The Community and its member States actively supported the work of the Conference on Disarmament, pursuant to resolution 46/36 L, on the question of transparency in armaments. In their opinion, the work of the Conference on the question of the

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

modalities for the expansion of the Register to cover military inventories and purchases related to national production was an important contribution to the work of the group of governmental experts which would convene in 1994.

18. The Community and its member States were considering the question of amending the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, in particular, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II). They urged all member States to reduce the number of deaths and injuries, especially among the civilian population, resulting from the excessive use of anti-personnel mines in the armed conflicts raging in a number of regions of the world. They urged all States Parties to the Convention to comply strictly with the provisions of Protocol II. France had requested the Secretary-General to convene a review conference to consider amendments to the Convention, if possible in 1994. The Community and its member States hoped that such an initiative would lead to an increase in the number of States Parties to the Convention, which currently stood at 37, and that the review conference would lead to increased compliance with the Convention and enhance its effectiveness.

19. In the opinion of the Community and its member States, enhancing the effectiveness and the authority of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction would contribute to an effective verification regime. In that connection, they welcomed the positive and inspiring results achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts which had been assigned the task of identifying and examining potential verification measures. They appealed to all States Parties to the Convention to request the Depository States to convene a special conference to examine the results of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and to take decisions regarding further efforts which should lead to the conclusion of a protocol on verification. They urged States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention on Bacteriological Weapons and to make their contribution to the confidence-building measures which had been strengthened or extended during the Third Review Conference in 1991.

20. Since the end of the cold war, significant developments in the field of regional disarmament had occurred in Europe thanks to the efforts of CSCE. The extension of regional disarmament measures to other regions would promote world disarmament. The States members of the European Community noted with satisfaction the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of international security (A/48/42, annex II). The Community and its member States would continue in the future to support any initiative that would lead to the strengthening of security in any given region. Furthermore, they invited all States which were members of the Disarmament Commission to take an active part in work on questions relating to science and technology and nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of agreement on an agenda for the forthcoming session of the Commission.

21. The Community and its member States welcomed the conclusion by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of an agreement on mutual

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

recognition and commended the Israeli and Palestinian leaders for their courage and foresight. They reaffirmed their commitment to the cause of world peace and hoped that similar progress would be made in the areas of mutual trust, stability and arms control. They were prepared to participate in international arrangements arising out of the implementation of the agreement, to expand their already substantial assistance to the occupied territories and to contribute to all forms of regional economic cooperation.

22. At its resumed session in the spring of 1993, the First Committee had reaffirmed the unique role of the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral body for conducting negotiations on disarmament, and in doing so reaffirmed its special status within the disarmament mechanism of the United Nations. The member States of the European Community commended the effectiveness with which the four ad hoc committees of the Conference had begun their work in the new international climate, which called for an increasingly multilateral approach. They favoured significantly increasing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament and regretted that it had not yet been able to reach a consensus acceptable to all on that issue. They supported the efforts of the President of the Conference and hoped that such consensus would soon be reached.

23. The new international climate provided a historic opportunity to reduce the number of weapons in the world and to create an atmosphere of mutual trust. The European Community and its member States would do everything within their power to ensure that the current session of the First Committee was able to make new progress in that difficult but promising direction.

24. Mr. HERMAN (Hungary), noting there had been some positive developments in the field of the strengthening of international security and the promotion of disarmament and arms regulation, said that his Government had always devoted special attention in its foreign policy to the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Since the end of the bipolar world system, the significance of such efforts in the ongoing process of developing a new structure of international relations had increased considerably. It would be a fatal error if, as during the cold war period, the international community were to build that structure on a dubious balance of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and on the theory of mutual deterrence. Such a course of events would undermine the stability and security of the regions concerned.

25. His Government attached great significance to the ratification of the START-II Treaty and its adjustment to current realities following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to a ban on nuclear tests, introduced unilaterally by the majority of the nuclear Powers. The international community had finally managed to achieve a historic breakthrough in the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, which gave reason to hope that, in the not too distant future, progress would also be made in the field of biological weapons.

26. The implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons required the unflagging attention of Governments; at the same time, attention should not be diverted from numerous other unresolved issues, such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with particular emphasis on the forthcoming 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

(Mr. Herman, Hungary)

Nuclear Weapons, the comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear tests and the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

27. Despite the disintegration of the former dictatorial regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the radical political and economic changes and reforms in every country of the region had not yet progressed sufficiently to ensure that those processes were irreversible. In addition to inherited economic problems, problems inevitably arose owing to the period of transition, which led to increased social tensions that could, in the absence of requisite prospects for the future, weaken and even undermine democratic institutions.

28. The only way to ensure progress in that situation was to adopt a comprehensive approach to security. A practical manifestation of that approach would be the establishment of a common European security structure in which the United Nations would have its place and role in the same way as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Council of Europe and the institutions of Euro-Atlantic integration. Those institutions should further improve their cooperation in identifying, as early as possible, the roots of potential conflicts, removing them, preventing hostilities and settling and eliminating conflicts that continued to surface. Preventive diplomacy and effective cooperation among those institutions should assume an even greater role in ensuring European and international security.

29. His country paid particular attention to NATO and to attaining membership in that Organization, which played a decisive part in the process of creating a new security structure for Europe. Recent cooperation between the United Nations and NATO had proved clearly that cooperation between organizations responsible for, and capable of, assuring and guaranteeing security was necessary and, in the current situation, vital.

30. Aware of the fact that the United Nations and NATO now had to face a growing demand for peace-keeping activities, his country had decided to play a more active role in such activities and, in proportion to its financial capabilities, would begin, the following year, to train peace-keeping units to participate in the operations of both organizations.

31. A positive example of such cooperation was the way in which the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations had cooperated with the European regional institutions and organizations in connection with the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the banning of flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also with NATO in the context of a possible use of air power. His country attached great importance to the fact that NATO and the Western European Union had expressed their willingness to cooperate closely in the field of peace-keeping under the auspices of the United Nations.

32. The Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace" had also made a significant contribution to adjusting peace-keeping to the new circumstances. On the basis of the experience gained, in particular in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, his country saw the possibility of further refining the theoretical approach to the issues and developing a new generation of peace-keeping activities in which there would be no rigid distinction between

(Mr. Herman, Hungary)

traditional peace-keeping and peace-enforcement activities which were also geared to handling crisis situations, either within individual States or in disintegrating State formations.

33. Mr. GRAHAM (United States of America) said that the rapid succession of events following the end of the cold war, both positive and darkly threatening, had emphasized the need to reassess programmes of action in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and to pursue efforts aimed at adapting arms control activities to the current international security environment. A good start had been made in that process, but much remained to be done.

34. It should be borne in mind that arms control was a policy tool available to all, and it could and should be used by each State, not only for itself, but for the good of the entire international community. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that arms control was, by nature, fundamentally political. In essence, it was about shaping relations, expectations and behaviour. It could provide useful guidelines along roads too infrequently travelled which led to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the effective and non-violent management of competing interests. If arms control was to play that role successfully, four priority tasks had to be accomplished.

35. The first was to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. In that regard, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had already been signed by almost 160 parties, fulfilled an important role. For more than 20 years, that Treaty had successfully contained the spread of nuclear weapons and facilitated the efforts of the United States and other countries to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. The security benefits of that Treaty were evident in every region of the world. For example, South Africa's adherence to the Treaty in 1991 had been a concrete contribution to regional efforts to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa. Adherence to the Treaty by all of the States that had emerged from the former Soviet Union would help eliminate the risk of dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons and would facilitate productive relationships with neighbouring and other countries. Full compliance with the Treaty by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was essential to reducing the level of tension in Asia. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had greatly developed on the basis of the Treaty. Consequently, his country would make every effort to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty in 1995.

36. Activities designed to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not, however, be restricted to measures to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States supported two initiatives to that end and called on all members of the international community to join it in that support. The first was a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or the separation of plutonium for nuclear explosive devices or outside the system of international safeguards. It would complement measures relating to fissionable nuclear material, such as eliminating, where possible, excess stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium and applying the strictest safety standards and international accountability to existing stocks of such materials; eliminating the need for enriched uranium in civil nuclear

(Mr. Graham, United States)

facilities; encouraging more restrictive regional arrangements to limit the production of fissionable material in unstable regions of instability where there is a high risk of proliferation; ensuring that IAEA inspectors had access to the fissionable material of the United States no longer needed for deterrent purposes; and purchasing highly enriched uranium from the former Soviet Union and other countries for peaceful use as reactor fuel. The second initiative, which represented a major policy change by the Clinton administration, was the rapid completion of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United States welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban the necessary mandate, and it hoped to play an active role in negotiations on that issue. Attainment of that goal would be assisted if all the nuclear Powers observed the continued moratorium on nuclear testing. In that connection, the United States deeply regretted the decision by China to conduct an underground nuclear explosion, and urged it to refrain from further testing.

37. The United States was equally determined to work for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention represented a major milestone in that endeavour; the accession to the Convention of more than 150 States was encouraging, yet still insufficient, and the United States appealed to all States to sign the Convention to ensure that adherence was universal. The United States also supported further efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, including through the creation of a transparency regime to enhance its effectiveness. It also appealed to all States parties to give serious consideration to the idea of convening a conference to identify and examine potential verification measures under the Convention, and supported the early convening of such a conference.

38. The appearance of advanced missile capabilities in the arsenals of a growing number of States was radically transforming the geostrategic landscape and creating the threat of the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against civilian populations, however far removed from areas of military confrontation. In the context of its new non-proliferation initiative, the United States intended to promote the use of the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a global non-proliferation norm and would seek to use the MTCR as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat the proliferation of missile technology.

39. Strengthening all existing non-proliferation foundations would also help accomplishment of the second priority task, the establishment of universal arms control norms. To that end, financial support should be given to IAEA, which had a vital role in applying international safeguards under the NPT. States should also be prepared to share with IAEA any information relevant to its safeguard responsibilities, and to give it strong political support. The commitment of the United States to the observance of international norms was also manifest in its own non-proliferation policy and, in that context, the adoption of effective export controls underlined its seriousness of purpose and its recognition that multilateral agreements and international export controls were complementary instruments for achieving arms control and non-proliferation objectives.

(Mr. Graham, United States)

40. The third major task on the current arms control agenda was to apply the relevant experience and confidence-building measures to the settlement of regional disputes. Positive developments in that area over the previous year had included the initiation of a security dialogue by members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); the continued exploration by Latin American States of regional arms control possibilities; the steady progress of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East peace process; and negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. At the same time, there was cause for concern that interest in the adoption of such measures was not universally shared. Some States declined to implement their share of the collective responsibility to take practical arms control measures, preferring to talk of controlling the arms of others, primarily the super-Powers. In the view of the United States, the 80 replies submitted to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms established under General Assembly resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments, represented a good response - but not good enough. The Register could clearly be strengthened and the United States called for efforts to increase the participation of member States and to improve the quality of the information submitted. In addition to its proposals on enhancing transparency and openness, in particular that States should exchange information on military holdings and procurement through national production, the United States had given its consent to ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies. That Treaty would also contribute to greater openness and transparency in military matters in Europe.

41. Finally, the fourth major task on the arms control agenda was to eliminate excess stocks of arms and inordinate defence industry capacity, the heritage of the cold war era. One of the major goals for the United States in that area was ensuring the swift entry into force of the START I and II treaties. While the United States believed that nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union were under reliable control, the breakup of the Soviet Union had created new concerns about the security of those nuclear systems. The United States Congress had authorized the allocation of approximately US$ 1 billion over the previous two years, and planned to authorize an additional US$ 400 million for the coming year, to assist in the safe and secure dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and to help prevent their proliferation.

42. Even before the Berlin wall came down, work to address another legacy of the past had already begun: the problem of conventional weapons, whose greatest concentrations had been in Europe. Nearly a year had elapsed since the initiation of the three-year cycle of measures to reduce major stocks of conventional weapons, provided for under the CFE Treaty, and the United States hoped to see that positive trend continue. Efforts to review the provisions of the Treaty were in no one's interest.

43. All States had a stake in the successful conversion of the defence industry. Finding alternative employment for the weapons scientists of the former Soviet Union was a major concern and to that end, short-term scientific research and development projects were to be funded through the new international science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev. In addition, those scientists could create long-term high technology civilian enterprises which could be commercially viable.

(Mr. Graham, United States)

44. Increasing concern was caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. In that connection, the United States, together with other States, was working on an initiative in the First Committee to control the export of mines.

45. The international community would not reach its goal of creating a more stable and peaceful world if States proved unable to reverse the dangerous trend of proliferating weapons of mass destruction; if it was not possible to establish and sustain strong international non-proliferation norms; if no progress was made in the resolution of disputes in those regions of the world most prone to eruptions of violence and to conflicts; and if the last vestiges of the cold war were not eliminated once and for all. At the same time, changes in the world situation suggested that prospects for replacing the antagonisms of the past with cooperation, for creating a progressively more stable strategic balance, for preventing proliferation and for quelling regional conflicts were entirely realistic. To that end, joint efforts must continue to ensure effective arms control and confidence-building measures.

46. Mr. PONCE (Ecuador) said that, during the past year, there had been a number of positive changes in the international climate. At the same time, there had been some developments which represented a serious threat to international peace and security and revealed the flaws in the current system of international relations, namely, the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the re-emergence of extremist ideologies in Europe and some parts of Asia, the emergence and revival of serious disputes among the former Soviet republics, and the proliferation of internal conflicts in Africa and some regions of Asia.

47. On the basis of experience, it could be inferred that the meaning of the term "international security" included elements unrelated to the military aspects of the issue. In his annual report, the Secretary-General had stressed the interrelationship between peace, development and democracy. The participants in the World Conference on Human Rights, held at Vienna, had called the right to development the most important element of universal progress. Accordingly, there could be no serious talk of international security until such time as justice prevailed in international economic relations; to that end, all members of the international community must contribute to collective development.

48. After a long period of stagnation in the area of nuclear disarmament, positive trends had emerged. Noting the importance of the preparations for the NPT review conference, he expressed regret at the modest results which had been achieved at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee; the participants in the meeting had been unable to reach agreement even on procedural matters. In that connection, Ecuador hoped that the principled political stance adopted by States with regard to other aspects of the nuclear disarmament issue would also be apparent during future stages of those extremely important negotiations.

49. Ecuador attached special significance to the question of disarmament and development and believed that a more thorough examination of the interrelationship between those two processes would promote the implementation, at the national and the international levels, of a policy that would enable all mankind to reap the benefits of the "peace dividend".

(Mr. Ponce, Ecuador)

50. In connection with agenda item 155, Ecuador had expressed its views concerning the financing mechanism for the mine-clearance programme. In addition, it supported the idea of convening a conference to review the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

51. His delegation supported the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, as reported in document A/48/358. The international community would undoubtedly approve any measures designed to enhance the efficiency of work related to the consideration of disarmament matters. His Government expressed its appreciation to the Centre for the assistance which it had provided in the holding of the first seminar on matters relating to disarmament and international security, and hoped that cooperation in that area would increase.

52. He welcomed the successful results achieved at the latest session of the Disarmament Commission, and reaffirmed the importance which Ecuador attached to the successful conclusion of the Commission's discussion of the items relating to nuclear disarmament and the role of science and technology at its 1994 session. His delegation supported the proposal, referred to in General Assembly resolution 47/54 A that, at future sessions, the Commission should begin consideration of the items entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction" and "International arms transfer, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H".

53. His delegation was also prepared to participate actively in the consultations to be conducted by the Chairman with a view to the further rationalization of the Committee's work.

54. Mr. LAAJAVA (Finland) said that the times called for new approaches to disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had been ratified by an unprecedented number of countries, formed the basis for international efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The example shown by the Republic of South Africa and the efforts being made by the Latin American countries reflected a growing recognition by countries that their national security could be strengthened through non-nuclear weapon status and adherence to the non-proliferation regime.

55. The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT was a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. Finland urged that country to reverse its decision and to resume compliance with its international obligations.

56. In 1995 the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended unconditionally and indefinitely, as it was in the interests of all to preserve the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Together with the other Nordic countries, Finland appealed to those countries which had not yet done so, to accede to that Treaty. He welcomed the ratification by Belarus of the START-I Treaty and its accession to the NPT, and he urged Kazakhstan to fulfil its commitment by

(Mr. Laajava, Finland)

acceding to the NPT. It was to be hoped that Ukraine would accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and would ratify the START-I Treaty, thus making it possible to implement the START-II Treaty.

57. By the year 2003, the START treaties would have considerably reduced the strategic weapons arsenal. He also noted the major progress made in reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons systems in Europe, as well as other weapons systems. On the whole, the danger of nuclear war in Europe had never been so remote.

58. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would be an important means of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An effective verification mechanism would be central in that regard. Finland hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would begin negotiations on that issue early in 1994. It noted with satisfaction that, since September 1992, the nuclear-weapon States had refrained from nuclear testing, and expressed regret that China had conducted such a test. It was also to be hoped that the international community would soon enter into negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The verification of the nuclear-test ban and of the halting of the production of fissionable material could be entrusted to IAEA.

59. As to the new steps being taken with regard to chemical and biological weapons, it was essential to remove all obstacles to the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention by those countries which had not yet done so. The successful carrying out of the preparatory work and the full implementation of the Convention constituted priorities in the area of disarmament. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, Finland welcomed the results achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, and agreed with the conclusion that verification of the Convention would be possible.

60. Non-proliferation efforts must be complemented by effective export controls. Finland fully subscribed to all the multilateral export control regimes relating to weapons of mass destruction and noted that controls were not an obstacle to legitimate trade or transfers.

61. With regard to the need to step up efforts to prevent the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, he appealed to countries which had not yet done so to make their national data available to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. He stressed the need to strengthen the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and said that Finland supported the adoption of the proposed additional protocol to the Convention at the forthcoming review conference.

62. The new challenges in the field of disarmament highlighted the need to strengthen the multilateral disarmament machinery. With reference to the steps taken towards that end in the First Committee, at the resumed session in the spring of 1993, he said that there were still many unexploited possibilities for streamlining the Committee's work; in Finland's view, the First Committee should become the principal political committee of the General Assembly. He fully supported the Chairman's efforts to streamline the Committee's work.

(Mr. Laajava, Finland)

63. As had been emphasized at the resumed session, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs must have the requisite capacity to carry out its tasks. In that connection, adequate Secretariat support was required.

64. The Conference on Disarmament was the only global disarmament negotiating forum. During the past year, it had been engaged in reviewing its current composition, and Finland regretted that it had not yet been possible to reach agreement on that question. His delegation urged the States members of the Conference to pursue their efforts to reach a consensus during the inter-sessional period, before the next session of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.